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Abstract
Thelegal bonding hypothesis (Co®ee, 1999, 2002, Stulz, 1999,
Reese and Weisbach, 2002, and Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004)
posists that ¯rms can e®ectively bypass their local market and
opt-in to the superior disclosure and legal regime of the U.S. by
cross listing on a U.S. exchange or Nasdaq. The crucial assump-
tion underlying the legal bonding hypothesis isthat the domestic
or ordinary investorsof these¯rmsarebetterprotected underthe
U.S. regime. We test this proposition. Employing the agency
models of dividendsthat derivea relationship between changes in
investor protection and changes in ¯rm dividend payout, wedoc-
ument results consistent with the legal bonding hypothesis. Our
initial resultsare consistent with thenotion that the domesticin-
vestors of ¯rms that cross list on U.S. exchanges enjoy enhanced
protection, post-listing. Thedomesticinvrstors of OTC ¯rmsare
not. The domestic investors of Portal ¯rms appear to be. How-
ever, we believethat they are better protected through enhanced
¯rm level governance policies that are initiated post-listing in
line with Pinnegar and Ravichandran (2004). Durnev and Kim
(2002) and Klapper and Love (2002) document the e®ectiveness
of ¯rm-level governance in enhancing ¯rm value and improving
¯rmperformance. To reach theseconclusionsour paperwarrants
further study.
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11 Introduction
High-growth ¯rms domiciled in countries characterised by poor legal in-
stitutional frameworks, and thus poor investor protection (LaPorta et
al., 1998, 2000) are very often constrained in their attempts to ¯nance
their growth opportunities externally (Hail and Leuz, 2003). Absent ef-
fective legal reform, many ¯rms engage in substitute strategies designed
to lower their domestic cost of capital. For example, the extant litera-
ture has suggested that such ¯rms can engage in cross-border strategic
alliances (Siegel, 2004), seek political favour (Siegel, 2004, Leuz and
Oberholzer-Gee, 2003), or commit themselves to greater protection of
their minority shareholders by improving their internal ¯rm-level gover-
nance (Klapper and Love, 2003, Durnev and Kim, 2003). Furthermore,
a ¯rm can substitute their home level governance for the superior dis-
closure and regulatory regime of the United States by cross-listing on
a U.S. exchange or Nasdaq. Cross-listing in the United States lowers
the ¯rms cost of equity capital (Hail and Leuz, 2004, and Eaton, Nof-
singer and Weaver 2003). As a result, cross-listing in the U.S. improves
the ¯rms ability to exploit their growth opportunities1 (Lins, Strickland,
and Zenner, 2003, Hail and Leuz, 2004, Lee, 2003, Reese and Weisbach,
2002).2
The ability of ¯rms to lower their cost of capital post-listing, is at
least in part due to their commitment to better protect their investors
under the U.S. legal and regulatory regime. Furthermore, the legal
bonding hypothesis (Co®ee 1998, 2002, Reese and Weisbach 2002, Mit-
ton 2002, Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz 2004, and Doidge 2004) posits that
¯rms can substitute their home level governance for the superior gover-
1Siegel (2004) outlines that Mexican ¯rms that list domestically, post-
liberalization, were more likely to choose a U.S. listing rather than adopt a cross-
border alliance. This is consistent with Claessens, Klingebiel and Schmukler (2003)
who conclude that ¯rms can bind themselves to higher standards on international
markets only when the country of origon has passed some hurdle in terms of legal
and overall development.
2Pre-1998 the motivation behind a cross-listing, and the accrued bene¯ts were
explained entirely in terms of integration bene¯ts. By cross-listing internationally,
¯rms can overcome the barriers to segmented markets (e.g., taxes, regulatory restric-
tions, or informational constraints) (Stapleton and Subrahmanyam, 1977, Alexander,
Eun and Janaikamanan, 1987, 1988, Stulz, 1981, Errunza and Losq, 1985). The sub-
sequent increase in the ¯rms non-domestic shareholder base, ensures that the risk of
the ¯rm is globally, rather than domestically shared. Greater risk-sharing reduces
the risk premium required by investors to hold the ¯rms stock. Foerster and Karolyi
(1999) advance the `Recognition Hypothesis', a joint test of the market segmentation
hypothesis and the `Awareness Hypothesis' of Merton (1987). Their results show
how the segmentation bene¯ts only accrue tothe ¯rm if investors hold the ¯rms stock.
For an excellent review of the early cross-listing literature, see Karolyi (1998).
2nance regime of the U.S. by cross-listing on a U.S. Exchange (NYSE,
AMEX) or the Nasdaq, implying better protection for both U.S. and
domestic investors. For example, Benos and Weisbach (2004) conclude
that ¯rms that list in the United States confer substantially more rights
ontheir shareholders, both U.S. andinternational, thanthey would have
received otherwise. In addition, Reese and Weisbach (2002) document
that emerging market U.S. cross-listed ¯rms, previously constrained in
their attempts to raise domestic external capital pre-listing, raise sub-
stantial domestic capital post a U.S. listing. This line of reasoning
suggests that ¯rms bond themselves to more transparency in, not only
the U.S. market but also in their home market, implying an increase in
protection for their domestic shareholders. Thus the crucial assump-
tion underlying the legal bonding hypothesis is that the domestic or
ordinary shareholders of the cross-listed ¯rms are better protected, post-
listing (Kumar and Ramchand 2003, Benos and Weisbach 2004, Reese
and Weisbach 2002). We attempt to test this crucial assumption.
The primary criticism aimed at the legal bonding hypothesis is that
SEC enforcements against cross-listed ¯rms have been largely illusionary
and non-e®ective, this does not imply that listing in the U.S. does not
a®ordat least someprotectiontodomestic investors. Forexample, there
is a considerable literature that suggests that post-listing, cross-listed
¯rms provide greater disclosure under U.S. GAAP (Eaton, Nofsinger and
Weaver, 2004), attract considerable institutional investment (Kumarand
Ramchand, 2003), and are followed by more ¯nancial analysts (Baker,
Nofsinger and Weaver, 2002, and Lang, Lins and Miller, 2002). For
example, Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver (2004) show for a sample of
international ¯rms cross-listed on the NYSE how varying measures of
disclosure, including analyst following is inversely related to both a¯rms
systematic risk, and their cost of equity capital. In connection, Lang,
Lins and Miller (2004) show how analysts can act as e®ectivemonitors in
emergingmarkets. There exists a substantial literaturedocumenting the
monitoring role played by institutional investors (Smith, 1996, Carleton
et al., 1998). In connection, Bradshaw, Bushee and Miller (2002)3 show
that ¯rms who reconcile their accounts to U.S. GAAP, attract sizable
institutional investment . In addition, a cross-listing can signi¯cantly
alter the behaviour of management and align their interests with those
of minority investors (Tribukait, 2002). Furthermore, in a sample of
144 ¯rms cross-listed on the U.S., Kumar et al. (2003) show that many
of these undergo signi¯cant governance related changes, in the form of a
reduction in the dominant shareholders ownership in the year following
3Khanna, Palepu, and Srinivasan (2003) show how ¯rms interacting with U.S.
product, labour, and equity markets adopt U.S. GAAP.
3a cross-listing, but not in the form of a change in ownership structure
(Ayyagari, 2004). This suggests that absent e®ective legal bonding,
reputational bonding can still be e®ective in increasing the quality of the
¯rms information environment, and hence reduce incomplete (Merton,
1987) and asymmetric information (Easley and O'Hara, 2003) borne by
investors. Irrespective of whether ¯rms can e®ectively legally bond to
the U.S. disclosure and regulatory environment, reputational bonding
can still increase the protection of domestic shareholders
Our paper is not the ¯rst to attempt to answer whether the domes-
tic investors of ¯rms cross-listed in the U.S. are in fact better protected.
However, we take a di®erent approach. Unlike the others, we do not
examine any one speci¯c governance variable and relate changes in this
variable to increased investor protection. We do the opposite. We
relate changes in investor protection to changes in governance variables,
thus allowing us to examine a number, rather than one governance vari-
able4. Thus, initially, we examine whether the domestic investors of
¯rms cross-listed in the U.S. are better protected. We then relate this
change in investor protection, to changes in governance, and disclosure
related variables. We do so by adopting the agency models of divi-
dends (Easterbrook, 1984)5. These models suggest that ¯rm dividend
payout can address agency problems characterised by the separation of
ownership from control by reducing managements opportunity to invest
¯rms free cash °ow in negative net present value projects. Further-
more the payout of dividends exposes ¯rms to the added scrutiny of the
capital market by increasing their reliance on external capital to fund
their growth opportunities (Easterbrook, 1984, Roze®, 1982). This line
of reasoning suggests that dividends and alternative goverance mecha-
nisms are substitutes for one another (Easterbrook, 1984). In fact Liu
(2002) ¯nds evidence in favour of this. Generally, these ¯ndings suggest
that changes in¯rm dividend payout imply changes in domestic investor
protection.
Using a sample of 496 ¯rms with sponsored ADR programs and
2922 non cross-listed ¯rms we estimate a panel data tobit model and
a di®erence-in-di®erence analysis over the period from 1980-2002. Our
results imply that for exchange listed ADRs and consistent with the le-
4The results that we present in this paper are for the ¯rst part of the paper. We
are currently working on the second part.
5In recent years, ¯nancial economists have once again returned to agency models
in their quest to understand why exactly ¯rms pay dividends, the famous Dividend
Puzzle ( Easterbrook, 1984, Roze®, 1982, Jensen, 1986) These models propose that
¯rm dividend policies address agency problems between controlling shareholders, and
outside shareholders by forcing ¯rms to pay out dividends, rather than allow FCF to
remain in the control of controlling shareholders.
4gal bonding hypothesis that the domestic investors of ¯rms are better
protected, post-listing. Furthermore, we also ¯nd that the domestic in-
vestors of ¯rms trading over-the-counter (OTC) via a Level 1 ADR are
not better protected. However, inconsistent with the legal bonding hy-
pothesis, but perhaps consistent with Pinegar et al. (2004)6, our results
suggest that post-listing, minority investors of ¯rms trading under SEC
Rule 144a on the PORTAL, are better protected. Pinegar et al. (2004)
show how this enhanced protection does not arrive under the U.S. disclo-
sure and legal regime, but via actions by the ¯rm to voluntarily commit
to fair treatment of their investors. This conclusion, which warrants
further study would be consistent with the legal bonding hypothesis,
and consistent with our ¯ndings.
2 Cross-Listing in the U.S.
A non-US ¯rm can list their ordinary shares in the United States ei-
ther directly, or as American Depositary Receipts. ADRs are in e®ect
a derivative product, representing either a multiple or fraction of the
ordinary share7. Precluding Israeli and Canadian ¯rms, the majority
of overseas listings in the U.S are by way of ADRs. Foreign ¯rms that
list their shares directly in the U.S. must meet two requirements; ¯rst
a minimum of 50% of the companies shares must be held by U.S. na-
tionals, and second, either the issuers' business is headquartered in the
U.S., or most of the senior executives or directors are U.S. citizens, or
50% of the ¯rms assets are located in the U.S. Furthermore, non-U.S.
¯rms can also trade in the U.S. via ADRs. There are four depositary
receipt programs available to ¯rms, di®ering in terms of their trading lo-
cale, disclosure and legal requirements, and capital raising entitlements.
They are a Level 1, Level 2/3 exchange listings, and private placements
traded on the Portal under SEC Rule144a.
A sponsored, public Level 1 OTC depositary receipt program is the
simplest way for non-US ¯rms to access US and non-US capital markets.
They trade `over-the-counter' and also on some exchanges outside of the
U.S., with prices published on the \Pink Sheets". Unlike, Level 2/3
Depositary Receipt programs, Level 1 ¯rms are not obligated to comply
and conform to US GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles)
or to ¯le periodic reports with the SEC (Securities & Exchange Com-
mission). In this regard, a Level 1 program allows the ¯rm access to
the US Capital markets, without the costs associated with accounting
6Of course we have to prove this.
7This ratio is determined by the ADR Ratio. The ADR Ratio is set to allow the
¯rm to compete in a price range similiar to their peer industry group in the U.S.
5and legal compliance. They require minimal SEC registration, and
are exempt from the SEC's reporting and accounting obligations under
Rule 12g3-2(b). Numerous studies (Sarr, 2001) have found that the
primary factor deterring ¯rms from establishing exchange-listed ADRs,
has been the costs associated with compliance to US GAAP. In this
regard it is not surprising that of the total number of ADR Programs,
the list is dominated by Level 1 Programs. In 1999, the OTCBB (Over
the Counter Bulletin Board) introduced regulation requiring all ¯rms to
complywiththe reportingrequirements underthe Securities& Exchange
Act of 1934. This in e®ect increased the disclosure requirements of the
¯rms, and imposed signi¯cant costs on the part of ¯rms. Bushee and
Leuz (2003) outline that this \Eligibility Rule" forced many ¯rms o® the
OTCBB to less regulated markets. For those ¯rms that remained, they
experienced positive stock returns and permanent increases in liquidity.
Furthermore all remaining¯rms were subject to increased liability under
section 18 of the 1934 Securities Act.
Level 2 and Level 3 ADR programs facilitate those non-US ¯rms
that wish to list on an organised exchange (NYSE/AMEX) or Nasdaq
in the United States. Level II ADRs are sponsored, public ADRs
that do not provide for capital raising in the US. On the other hand,
Level III provisions, facilitate the issuance of new stock in the United
States. Theliteraturehasalsoshownthat aLevel 2and3ADRfacilitate
greater merger and acquisition activity on the part of the ¯rm in the
U.S. (Burns, 2001, Kumar and Ramchand, 2003, Tolumen and Torstila,
2002); a U.S. ADR Listing facilitates a more cost e±cient stock based
acquisition strategy on the part of the ¯rm. The number of exchange
listed programs has risen substantially in the last decade. For example,
thenumber has risenform 256programs in 1993 toa peak of 623 in 2001.
The ¯gure, as of June 2003, now stands at 527. In connection, most
of this increase has been concentrated in NYSE Listings: The NYSE
share of ADR exchange listings has risen from 17% in 1985 to 65%
in 1999. Over the same period, Nasdaq's share of depositary receipt
listings declined alarmingly, from 77% in 1985 to 34% in 1999. The
American Stock Exchange's share has fallen from 5% to 1% over the
same period: it now accounts for only two depositary receipt listings.
The Bank of New York (2002) provide evidence to suggest that ADRs
can constitute 5 to 15% of the ¯rms' investor base. In connection,
Edison and Warnock (2003) show how, contingent on being cross-listed
on a U.S. exchange, U.S. investors do not bias their portfolio holdings in
favour of U.S. stocks; emerging market ¯rms, cross-listed in the U.S. are
incorporated into U.S. portfolios at full International CAPM (ICAPM)
weights.
6Unlike Level 1 ADRs (and also Rule 144A ADRs) a Level 2/3 ADR
obligates the ¯rm to adhere to sizable disclosure, regulatory, and legal
requirements. More speci¯cally, an exchange listed ADR necessitates
the ¯rm to conform and adhere to US GAAP through Form 20-F Form
20-F registration statement contains detailed ¯nancial disclosure about
the issuer and detailed ¯nancial statements reconciled to US GAAP.
Exchange-Listed ADRs must register their ADRs through File F-6. In
addition, Level 3 capital raising ADRs must ¯le Form F-1.8 This form
registers the underlying equities that are o®ered publicly in the US.
Second, Level 2/3¯rmsbecome subjectto greater SEC scrutiny. Finally,
an exchange listed ADR becomes subject to civil liability9 under section
18 of the 1934 Securities & Exchange Act (Leuz, 2003)
A Rule 144A depositary receipt program, established by the SEC
in 1990 (also known as a Restricted ADR (RADR)) facilitates access
to US and non-US markets through a private placement of sponsored
depositary receipts to Quali¯ed Institutional Buyers (QIBs). Trades
are executed under the PORTAL (Private O®erings Retail Trading Au-
tomated Linkage) system, and cleared through the Depositary Receipt
Trust (DRT). Like Level 1 ADRs, they do not require compliance with
US GAAP or SEC registration. Under Regulation S, a company can
o®er a depositary receipt program to non-US investors on Designated
O®shore Securities Markets `DOSM'. It is not uncommon for ¯rms to
establish a Level 1 ADRinconnectionwith a 144A Program. Rule 144a
and Reg S private placements are, not surprisingly, given the size of the
private placement market, less liquid than public placements in the U.S.
3 The Legal Bonding Hypothesis and Implications
for Domestic Investor Protection
The legal bonding hypothesis, originally documented in the literature
by Co®ee (1999), and furthered by amongst others, Stulz (1999), Co®ee
(2002), Reese and Weisbach(2002), Doidge (2004), and Doidge, Karolyi,
and Stulz (2004), models the decision of ¯rms to cross-list in the U.S. in
terms of disclosure andlegal di®erences across countries. Firms that are
constrained in their ability to fund their growth opportunities at home
(Reese and Weisbach, 2002, and Lins, Strickland and Zenner, 200310)
8The Governance Requirements of the individual exchanges (NYSE/AMEX) and
Nasdaq imposed on US ¯rms have been largely waived for DRs. (Co®ee, 2002 p31).
9De¯ne
10The Capital Constraints Hypothesis of Lins, Strickland, and Zenner (2003) is
often cited as the `stepping stone' between the traditional risk premium hypothesis,
and the legal bonding hypothesis. Their theory simply states that ¯rms (especially
7due largely in part to underdeveloped legal institutions and capital mar-
kets (LaPorta et al., 1997) can mitigate against ¯nancial constraints
by cross-listing on a U.S. exchange or Nasdaq (Hail & Leuz, 200411).
This is achieved through a commitment to protect their investors bet-
ter, and reveal more information (Cantale, 1996, Moel, 1999, andFeurst,
2000). In essence, the legal bonding hypothesis posits that such ¯rms
can e®ectively substitute their home level governance for the superior
U.S. governance regime (Braverman, 1996, and Fox, 1998) `Listing'
over-the-counter, via a Level 1 ADR, or under the SEC Rule 144a on
the PORTAL, do not entail any signi¯cant regulatory obligations on the
¯rm, and thus imply no change in domestic investor protection.
Cross-listing in the United States12 via a Level 2/3 Exchange list-
ing, compels the ¯rm to comply with U.S. reporting and regulatory
laws. More speci¯cally, bonding to the U.S. obligates the ¯rms to; [1]
Conform to, and reconcile their accounting procedures to U.S. GAAP.
This is required only of Level II/III ADRs, and for direct listings on
a U.S. Exchange (NYSE/AMEX) or Nasdaq. Level 1, and RADR's
are not obliged to do so. Reconciliation to U.S. GAAP and a commit-
ment to provide fuller disclosures endows signi¯cant economic bene¯ts
on the ¯rm. For example, the accounting literature documents a rela-
tionship between a ¯rms commitment to provide greater disclosure and
the cost of capital (Leuz and Verrechia, 2000, Bushee and Leuz, 2003,
and Eaton, Nofsinger and Weaver, 2004). Furthermore, Lang, Ready
and Yetman (2003) ¯nd that non-US ¯rms cross-listed in the U.S. have
higher quality accounting information, measured in terms of earnings
management13, and timely loss recognition, relative to non-cross listed
emerging market ¯rms) cross-list in the U.S. to fund their growth opportunities.
Capital constraints at home preclude the ¯rm from doing so. This capital constraints
hypothesis, together with the legal bonding hypothesis, explicity state that the ¯rms
ability to ¯nance their growth opportunities, and overcome their domestic market
capital constraints, is facilitated when ¯rms bond themselves to the U.S. governance
regime. As such, the ¯rm commits to enhance the protection of their minority
shareholders. This gave rise to`The Better abillty tofund their growth opportunities'
hypothesis.
11Hail and Leuz (2003) ¯nd that the cost of capital is negatively related to the
degree of investor protection in a country; the greater the protection a®orded to
minority shareholders, the lower the cost of obtaining capital.
12Co®ee (1999) notes that ¯rms do not appear to view cross-listings in non-US
markets (For example, the LSE) as a close substitute for US listings. He outlines
that \for the foreign issuer, the NYSE still o®ers a critical advantage: its reputation
as a leading repository for high disclosure standards and market transparency. Here
it cleary outranks, its nearest competitor for listings, the LSE". However, Salva
(2003) ¯nds evidence in favour of the London Stock Exchange providing a bonding
role for cross-listed non-UK ¯rms.
13Leuz et al. (2003) show how earnings management is negatively related to the
8¯rms. [2] Exchange-listed ADRs, and direct listings must register and
¯le periodic forms withthe Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Registrationiscompleted on form20-F, underthe Securities Actof 1934.
Furthermore, capital-raising Level 3 ADR's must also register the securi-
ties on form F-1 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1933. Form 20-F
requires the ¯rm to reconcile their home level accounting standards to
US GAAP. RADR's are exempt under 12g3-2(b). Level 1 OTC ¯rms
are no longer exempt since the introduction by the SEC of the `Eligi-
bility Rule' in 199914. Prior to this, Level 1 OTC ¯rms were a®orded
the same exemption that currently applies to RADR's. Registration
with the SEC also exposes the ¯rm to possible SEC enforcement. [3]
Furthermore, a U.S. cross-listing also changes the ¯rms legal liability.
An exchange listed ADR becomes subject to civil liability under section
18 of the 1934 Securities & Exchange Act (Leuz, 2003). Co®ee (1999)
outlines how a U.S. cross-listing entails a sizable litigation risk. In con-
nection, Seetharaman, Gul, and Lynn, (2002), outline how auditors of
UK exchange-listed ¯rms, cross-listed in the US, charge a higher fee, to
compensate them for the greater litigation risk associated with the U.S.
legal regime. Although enforcement can prove to be di±cult, Doidge
(2001) outlines how the SEC can discipline ¯rms by de-registering shares
and suspending trading of the ADRs. The ¯ndings of Bailey, Karolyi
and Salva (2002), and Lang, Ready and Yetman (2003) suggest that
the increased enforcement and litigation environment, adopted by non-
US cross-listed ¯rms is, at a minimum, a su±cient threat that ensures
they ful¯ll their obligations. In a sample of Mexican cross-listed ¯rms,
Tribukait (2002) ¯nds evidence consistent with this. The U.S. Security
Laws, are not only designed to improve ¯rm disclosure and ¯nancial re-
porting, but are also designed to mitigate the e®ects of the separation of
ownership and control. Co®ee (1999) points out that such laws are also
designed to reduce ¯rm agency costs by placing substantive obligations
on controlling insiders. Doidge (2001) outlines that this is achieved by
imposing ownership disclosure, insider trading, tender o®er, and `Going
Private' rules on controlling shareholders/management.
Cross-listing in the U.S. also exposes the ¯rms to the added scrutiny
of `Reputational Intermediaries' (Co®ee, 1999). These include ¯nancial
analysts, U.S. underwriters (for capital raising Level 3 ADR's), debt rat-
ing agencies, international auditors, and institutional investors15. The
degree of investor protection.
14See Bushee and Leuz (2003) for an analysis of the impact of the `Eligibility Rule'
on both ¯rm participation on the OTCBB, and for the economic consequences for
those that remained.
15`Shareholder Activism', also termed `Relationship Investing' has, over the course
9extant literature demonstrates how each can be e®ective in monitoring
controlling shareholders/management activity. For example, Doukas,
McKnight and Pantzalis (2000) ¯nd empirical support to suggest that
¯nancial analysts are e®ective in reducing ¯rm agency costs. In con-
nection, Lang, Lins and Miller (2004) document that analysts add most
in their role of monitors, when they cover ¯rms with poor internal gov-
ernance. Furthermore, their analysis suggests that analysts can help
to partially overcome the negative e®ects of poor external governance.
In an earlier study, Lang, Lins and Miller (2002) ¯nd that a U.S. cross-
listing is associated with increased analyst coverage, and greater earn-
ings forecast accuracy, with analyst coverage greater for exchange-listed
ADRs. In a discussion of the latter, Leuz (2003) outlines how increased
analyst following relies exclusively on the act of listing; a cross-listing
is associated with increased analyst following, but enhanced disclosure
is required for greater forecast accuracy. Baker, Nofsinger and Weaver
(2002), demonstrate how a non-domestic cross-listing is associated with
enhanced ¯rm visibility; the authors de¯ne visibility as the extent to
which analysts follow a ¯rm, and the amount of a ¯rms news coverage.
Their results show that an international cross-listing is associated with
increased¯rm visibility. Furthermore, ¯rms that cross-list on the NYSE
enjoy greater visibility than their counterparts that list on the London
Stock Exchange. Fan and Wong (2002) outline how the big-¯ve audi-
tors ful¯ll an important monitoring role in East Asia, thus providing an
important governance mechanism.
Cross-Listing in the U.S. is associated with increased [1] ¯rm-level
disclosure, and a simultaneous increase in [2] SEC enforcement, and [3]
legal liability. Although, the literature has documented considerable
support in favour of the legal bonding hypothesis, it is however, not
without its critics. Much, if not all of the critics of the legal bonding
hypothesis, question the extent to which breaches of SEC regulation,
by non-U.S. ¯rms are actually enforced (Fanto, 1996, LaPorta, Lopez-
Silanes, Shei°er and Vishny, 1999 (hereafter LLSV(1999), Licht, 2001,
2002, Siegel, 2003, 2004). For example, Siegel (2004) characterises the
SEC policy with respect to non-US ¯rms as largely a hands-o®, zero en-
of the last decade, become quiet prominent in the United States. This has in part
been driven by the ine®ectivness of the market for corporate control in the U.S.
over the same period, and in part due to the fact that a sizable proportion of U.S.
public pension funds were Indexed (shares cannot be sold when investors are unhappy
with management performance). Concurrently, numerous studies have examined the
activities of speci¯c instiitutions. For example, Smith (1996) focuses on the activities
of CalPERS (California Public Employees Retirement Systems), while Carleton et al.
(1998) concentrates on the TIAA-CREF. Del Grucio and Hawkins (1998) examine
a broader set of institutional shareholder activists.
10forcement policy. Licht (2002) concludes the the threat of enforcement
is `largely illusionary'. More recently, Siegel (2003) provides evidence
to suggest that during the `Mexican Crisis', Mexican ¯rms cross-listed
in the U.S. su®ered signi¯cant negative share price returns, largely at-
tributable to illegal asset taking on the part of inside owners. Second,
Licht(2002)outlines thatthe SEC operatesa moreaccomadating regula-
tory environment for non-US ¯rms, by waiving many of their regulatory
requirements Consequently, Licht (2002) argues that the U.S. has two
SEC Regulatory regimes; one for domestic, and other for non-US ¯rms.
Furthermore, Lang, Raedy and Wilson (2004) show how, compared to a
U.S. matched sample, ¯rms cross-listed in the U.S. manage their earn-
ings more aggresively. In connection, King andSegal (2003) outline how
Canadian ¯rms cross-listed in the U.S. are valued at a discount relative
to their U.S. counterparts. They attribute at least part of this discount
to di®erences in the goverance regimes imposed on both sets of ¯rms.
Both sets of ¯ndings are consistent with the arguements put forward by
Licht (2002); non-U.S. ¯rms that cross-list in the U.S. are not subject to
the same level of disclosure and regulatory rules required of U.S. ¯rms.
Finally, LLSV(1999)characterisebondingto the U.S. governanceregime
as purely reputational, rather than e®ective legal bonding. In fact, it
would now appear that in the words of Joos (2003, p.396) that \At the
very least, empirical work suggests that the e®ectiveness of the bonding
role of the SEC regulation presents an empirical question rather than an
established fact".
The crucial assumption underlying the legal bonding hypothesis is
that the under the U.S. regulatory regime, the ¯rms domestic or or-
dinary minority investors are better protected. Although the debate
surrounding the e®ectiveness of SEC enforcement has implications for
domestic investor protection, the absence of SEC enforcement, does not
imply that the domestic investors of ¯rms, listed on U.S. exchanges are
not better protected; it simply implies that those investors are not pro-
tected to the same extent to which domestic U.S. investors are. Recon-
ciliation and adherence to U.S. GAAP, analyst following, institutional
holdings, and the threat of punishment, can, enhance the protection af-
forded to domestic investors. This still implies that the bene¯ts accrue
only to the domestic investors of exchange listed ¯rms.
114 Agency Models of Dividends
The separation of ownership from control16 results in an agency cost for
shareholders and outsiders. Absent e®ective governance mechanisms,
this canleadto a wasteful use of free cash°ow (FCF) by corporate insid-
ers andmanagement at the expense ofoutsiders and minority sharehold-
ers. Consequently, this provides a motive for investors to force ¯rms to
disgorge cash from controlling managers. The literature has suggested
a number of mechanisms through which the free cash °ow of ¯rms is not
wasted on negative non present value projects. These include, amongst
others, debt (Fluck, 1998, 1999, Harvey, Lins andRoper, 2003), manage-
rial stock incentives (Fenn and Liang, 2001), block holders (DeAngelo
and DeAngelp, 2000) and dividends (Easterbrook, 1984, Jensen, 1986,
LaPorta et al., 2000, Liu, 2002). Theagency models of dividends outline
how dividends can play a role in reducing the agency costs of free cash
°ow, because they remove corporate wealth from insider control (Faccio
et al., 2003).
Agency models of dividends relax the Modigliani and Miller (1961)
assumption about the independence of dividend and investment policies.
In the presence of agency costs, dividend policy can serve as a partial
remedy to this problem (Roze®, 1982). These models suggest that ¯rm
dividend payout can address agency problems by reducing managements
opportunity toinvest¯rms free cash °ow in negative negative net present
value projects (Jensen, 1986). Furthermore the payment of dividends ex-
poses¯rms tothe addedscrutiny ofthecapital market by increasingtheir
reliance on external capital to fund their growth opportunities (Easter-
brook, 1984, Roze®, 1982)17. In fact, recent research by DeAngelo,
DeAngelo and Stulz (2004) outlines how absent dividend payouts, the
¯rms capital structure would eventually evolve into one characterised by
low debt, and high cash levels. This form of capital structure is con-
dusive to potentially large agency costs. Recent evidence in favour of
the agency models of dividends have been documented by Borokhovich,
Brunarski, Harman and Kehr (2004), Trojanowski (2004), Gugler and
Yurtoglu (2002), and Gugler (2003). A related study ¯nds that share-
holders discount the value of ¯rms with, amongst others, no dividend
payments (Kalcheva and Lins, 2004). Furthermore, numerous studies
have documented that the falling propensity of ¯rms to pay dividends
16This seperation of ownership from control is not uniformly de¯ned across the
world. In the U.S. and the U.K. and Ireland (Faccio and Lang, 2002) the relationship
is de¯ned as one between dispersed shareholders and management, and between
controlling insiders (mostly families) and outsiders in Asia, and mainland Europe
(Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 2000).
17Lins cash paper.
12over time can be partially explained by the adoption of better exter-
nal and internal corporate governance (Osobov, 2004, Fama and French,
2001, DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner, 2002, Baker and Wugler, 2002).
In line with Easterbrook (1984), this suggests that corporate governance
and dividends substitute for one another in reducing agency costs.
To clarify the role played by dividends in reducing theagency costs of
free cash °ow, we outline the equilibrium dividend policy of a ¯rm, out-
lined in Fluck (1999). The model proceeds as follows: outsiders face two
options; (1) They can retain management by not engaging in a control
challenge and receive their fraction of dividends. Management receive
their share along with their private bene¯ts of control (2) Outsiders can
initiate a control challenge to remove management. The probability of








where p(i) is as before, ± is a discount factor, Àl is the outsiders
dividend share of payout, and Àm is the controlling managements pri-
vate bene¯ts of control. Equation (1) simply states that the maximum
amount of dividends that management is willing to pay out is greater
than the mimimum amount that outsiders are willing to accept while
complying with current managerial control. d¤¤ is an increasing func-
tion of p(i);the more e®ective outsiders are in disciplining management,
the more is paid out individends. This forms the basis of the `Outcome'
model of dividends outlined by LaPorta et al. (2000). Dividend payouts
are greater in countries where investors are better protected, and lower
in countries where investors are poorly protected. On the other hand,
thesubstitutionmodel posits that dividends are an e®ective substitution
for legal protection implyinggreater dividend payouts incountries where
investors are poorly protected. The authors ¯nd support in favour of
the outcome model; dividend payouts are greater in countries where in-
vestors are better protected. Both Faccio et al. (2003) and Gugler
(2003) ¯nd evidence in favour of the outcome model. If p(i) is equal
to 0, outsiders have no power in disciplining management and cannot
force any dividends from management (Àl): Dividend payout disciplines
management in a number of ways: ¯rst it reduces the amount of free
cash °ow left at the disposal of management, thus reducing the quantity
available to expropriate, and second, by paying dividends it forces man-
agement to obtain external capital to fund growth opportunities, thus
13subjecting them to the scrutiny of the capital markets (Easterbrook,
1984). Theoretically, cross-listing in the United States improves the
protection a®oarded to minority investors/outsiders. From the `Out-
come' and `Substitution' models of dividends, increases in p(i) either:
² Forces ¯rms to pay out more dividends or
² Outsiders may accept less dividends as cross-listing in the U.S.
imposes sizable restraints on the ability of management to expro-
priate their minority inverstors. In this regard cross-listing in the
U.S. and dividends may act as substitute mechanisms in control-
ling the agency costs of free cash °ow. This argument is consistent
with Easterbrook (1984) who argues that dividends and alterna-
tive bondingdevices may be substitutes for one another. Similarly,
Liu (2002) concludes that, in an emerging market setting that spe-
ci¯c functional governance reforms are associated with lower ¯rm
dividend payouts; improvements in external governance reduces
the role played by dividends in reducing the agency costs of free
cash °ow. These arguments form the basis of the substitution
hypothesis.
5 Econometric Issues and Testable Hypotheses
In this section we outline the empirical methodology that we employ in
our analysis. The primary drawback with ¯rm-level accounting data is
that there exists, at least to the best of our knowledge, no time series
measure for ¯rm level disclosure, legal liability etc. Thus, in order to
estimate the impact of an international cross-listing on ¯rms' dividend

















motivation behind estimating the changes in dividend payout, and not
simply the post-listing dividend payout is to mitigate against concerns
regarding self-selection. A ¯nding of lower dividend payouts for cross-
listed ¯rms, post-listing implies nothing if those ¯rms paid out lower
dividends pre-listing as well. To further alleviate these concerns we
estimate seperately, pre and post-listing dividend payouts for all cross-

















The results are presented in tables 5 (g) and (h). Finally, we
estimate equation (2) along the lines of a `Di®erence-in-Di®erence' esti-
mator. To do so we subtract from each ¯rms payout the median non
cross-listed ¯rm payout (DivEARN & DivCF) for each year. Using
this adjusted dividend payout ratio we re-estimate equation (2). This
adjusted payout ratio is not censored. Due to data limitations we esti-
mate (5) over the period from 1990 to 2002. The results are presented
in tables 5 (e) and (f).
AdjDivit = ®+¢¯1L1it+¢¯2L2=3it+¢¯3Rule144ait+'0xit+±cit+"it+¹i
(5)
Divit is the dividend payout ratio for each ¯rm i in year t and
L1it;L2=3it;Rule144ait are standard 0/1 dummy variables that equal
one if the ¯rm i is cross-listed in the United States in year t, via a Level
1, 2/3, Rule 144a ADR Program, xit is the ith ¯rm level control vari-
able, cit is a set of time invariant country and industry level variables.
f®;¯1;¯2;¯3;';±g is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and "it is
an error term. The inclusion of time-invariant country level variables
would be perfectly correlated with the group speci¯c constant term, and
thus precludes us from estimating a ¯xed e®ects model Consequently,
we estimate a random e®ects model, with an error term augmented with
¹
i18: This speci¯cation represents the extent to which the intercept of
country i di®ers from the overall intercept. Under this speci¯cation, we
attempt to isolate the impact of cross-listing on the ¯rms' dividend pay-
out by controlling for both ¯rm and country level determinants of div-
idend payout. Furthermore, our dummy variable speci¯cation allows
the impact of cross-listing to di®er across the di®erent types of ADR
Programs (Level 1, Level 2/3, Rule 144a). We employ two di®erent
measures of our dependent variable, Divit. First, we employ the tradi-
tional measure of dividend payout as the amount of dividends paid out
from earnings, Div/EARN. It is de¯ned as Dividend per share/Earnings
per share*100. Our second measure is Dividends to cash°ow. It mea-
sures the amount of cash paid out to shareholders from cash°ow, and is
15de¯ned as Dividends per share/Cash°ow per share*100. Both variables
are calculated using data from Worldscope. However, as pointed out by
LaPorta et al. (2000), both measures have their limitations; ¯rst, both
measures depend on the countries accounting conventions, and conse-
quently they may not be comparable across countries. Second, both
can be easily manipulated using accounting tricks. The Div/EARN
measure may also be sensitive to earnings management on the part
of ¯rms. For example, Leuz et al. (2003) show how ¯rms domiciled
in countries characterised by poor protection of investors manage their
earnings more aggressively. Finally, the diversion of resources may have
occurred before earnings or cash°ows were reported, thus overstating
the true amount paid out to shareholders. Firm dividend payout is
censored to the left as payout can never be negative. If we hypothe-
sised that dividends could only be paid out of available earnings, rather
than available and retained earnings, our dependent variable would have
been both left and right censored. (Bhattacharyya, Mawani and Morill,
2003). Han, Lee and Suk (1999) employ a tobit analysis to examine the
relationship between dividend payout and institutional ownership. In
the truest sense of the variable, dividend payout is partly quantitative
(amount paid) and qualatative (to pay or not to pay). Given the na-
ture of our dependent variable, we estimate a random e®ects panel tobit
model. Our randon e®ects speci¯cation is supported by the Breusch
and Pagan (1980) test, which strongly rejects the hypothesis that the
variation of random e®ects is zero.
The crucial assumption underlying the legal bonding hypothesis is
that the domestic or ordinary investors of ¯rms cross-listed on U.S. ex-
changes (or Nasdaq) are better protected, at least partially, under the
U.S. governance regime. The agency models of dividends and espe-
cially the ¯ndings of Liu (2002), suggest that ¯rms dividend payout is a
function of changes in investor protection. Furthermore the legal bond-
ing hypothesis states that it is only those ordinary shareholders of ¯rms
cross-listed on U.S. exchanges who are better protected. Consequently,
a priori, we would expect that:
Hypothesis 1
¢¯2 6= 0 (6)
¢¯1;¢¯3 = 0 (7)
Second, we follow Liu (2002) and examine the sensitivity of dividends
to free cash °ow. Improvements in investor protection should alter the
16role played by dividends in controlling the costs associated withfree cash
°ow:
Hypothesis 2
¢¯2 ¤ FCF 6= 0 (8)
¢¯1 ¤ FCF;¢¯3¤ FCF = 0 (9)
Finally, we isolate the impact of an exchange-listed ADR across legal
regimes. We employ only those ¯rms from countries where investors are
poorly protected. We de¯ne these countries as those with a LaPorta et
al. (1998) anti-director rights measure of 2 or lower. The disclosure and
legal obligations requiredofthese ¯rms areconsiderablymore demanding
for these ¯rms, relative to those ¯rms that originate from countries with
e®ective governance. Consequently, we would expect that:
Hypothesis 3
¢¯2 ¤LowIP 6= 0 > ¢¯2 (10)
¢¯1 ¤LowIP;¢¯3¤ LowIP = 0 = ¢¯1;¢¯3 (11)
6 Firm, Industry and Country Control Variables
In order to isolate the impact of cross-listing across ¯rms, we attempt to
control for both ¯rm, industry, and country-level determinants of div-
idend payout cited in the literature, and employed in numerous other
dividend studies (Han, Lee and Suk, 1999, Bhattacharyya, Mawani and
Morill, 2003, Liu, 2002, Agrawal and Jayaraman, 1994). Following Liu
(2002) we employ the following controls: (1) Firms Investment Oppor-
tunity Set (2) Pro¯tability of Assets in place (3) Firm Size (4) Free Cash
Flow (FCF) (5) Asset Tangibility (6) Operating and Financial Leverage
and (7)Earnings Volatility19. Finally like LaPortaet al. (2000), and Liu
(2002) we do not control for open market stock repurchases. Although
there is a sizable literature that suggests, amongst others, dividends
and share repurchases are substitute devices for returning cash to share-
holders, and thus lowering the agency costs associated with free cash
19Han, Lee and Suk (1999) also control for the ¯rms target dividend payout ratio,
a la Lintner (1956).
17°ow) (GrullonandMichaely, 2000, Brav, Graham, Harvey andMichaely,
2003), the evidence also suggests that those ¯rms who repurchase their
stock do not pay dividends (LaPorta et al., 2000). Furthermore, Ja-
gannathan, Stephens and Weisbach (2000) provide an alternative view;
dividends and share repurchases are complementary to one another as
dividends are paid out of of the permanent component of ¯rms earnings,
while shares are repurchased using the transitory component of earn-
ings. Consequently, the exclusion of share repurchases will if anything
understate, rather than overstate our results.
Roze® (1982), Higgins (1972) and Jensen, Solberg and Zorn (1992)
posit that ¯rms with greater growth opportunities pay out lower divi-
dends, thus reducing the need for costly external ¯nance. We, like Liu
(2002), and Bhattacharyya et al. (2003) employ the Market to Book
Value of Assets MBA as our proxy for the ¯rms investment opportu-
nity set. Although other studies have used sales and revenue growth
as an equivalent proxy measure (Agarwal et al., 1994, Han et al., 1999).
Adam and Goyal (2002) show that the MBA is the best measure for the
¯rms investment set. Jensen at al. (1992) outline how ¯rm pro¯tability
and ¯rm payout are positively related; more pro¯table ¯rms are able to
payout greater dividends. We employ Return on Equity ROE, de¯ned
as Earnings per share (EPS) divided by the book growth per share, ex-
pressedas a % as our measure of ¯rm pro¯tability. There exists asizable
literature (Jensen, 1986) that demonstrates the relationship between free
cash °ow and dividend payout. Free Cash Flow FCF, de¯ned as cash-
°ow over and above which is required tomaintainassets inplace (Jensen,
1986), involves a signi¯cant cost, in terms of the agency con°ict between
the controlling shareholders and outside shareholders. Dividends are
one mechanism through which FCF can be diverted away from wasteful
investment towards outside shareholders. We de¯ne FCF as Earnings
before Interest and Taxation EBIT plus Depreciation, Depletion, and
Amortization DDA less Capital Expenditures CAPEX.
Fazarri etal. (1988)show how ¯nancial constraints impactnegatively
on ¯rm dividend payout. We control for both operating and ¯nancial
constraints, although both are endogenous. We de¯ne ¯nancial leverage
as Debt to Sales Debt and operating leverage as the cost of goods sold
COGS. Debt increases the probability of bankruptcy, and thus acts as a
disciplinary device precluding managers from investing in poor projects.
Zwiebel (1996) shows how managers may deliberately choose debt to
credibly constrain their own future empire building, and thus like divi-
dend payout is an alternative method of disgorging free cash °ow from
managers (Harvey, Lins and Roper, 2003). We proxy for ¯rm size using
the natural log of total assets expressed in a common currency (US$)
18Total Assets. Bhattacharyya et al. (2003) ¯nd that larger ¯rms payout
a higher proportion of their earnings as dividends, and retain less for
investment. We calculate asset tangibility as total assets less other in-
tangible assets AssetTang. Aivazian, Booth and Cleary (2003) explain
that asset tangibility is designed to measure the proportion of long term
\Hard" assets in the ¯rms capital structure. Similarly, Klapper and
Love (2003) outline how the composition of a ¯rms assets will a®ect its
contracting environment, because it is easier to monitor, and harder to
steal ¯xed, `Hard' assets, than `Soft' intangible assets. Finally, as out-
lined by Fama and French (2002), earnings and cash°ow volatility lower
¯rm dividend payout. We calculate earnings volatility as the variance
of the previous three years EPS EarnVolatility. To enable comparison
of variables across countries, we follow the approach of Liu (2002) and
scale all ¯nancial variables by net sales due to its comparability across
countries. Thus, we scale COGS, FCF, and Debt by net sales. Fi-
nally we repeat our analysis by including American Depositary Receipt
Dividends as a covariate in our equations. ADR dividends are ordinary
share dividends paid to the holders of ADRs', converted to US$ at the
prevailing spot exchange rate. We have no prior beliefs on the sign of
the coe±cient. For example, cross-listed ¯rms may pay lower dividends
post-listing, because of the increased shareholder base that they have to
service with dividends. On the contrary, we ¯nd that ¯rms that initiate
and pay ADR dividends pay higher dividends. Furthermore, we ¯nd
that the inclusion of ADR dividends does not alter our main conclu-
sions.20 All ADR Dividend data is sourced from The Bank of New York
(www.adrbny.com).
Finally, in order to account for di®erences in dividend payout across
countries and industries, we include both country and industry dum-
mies. First, we employ two country dummies; (1) A simple 0/1 dummy
for legal origin; 1 if the country employs common law, and 0 if the ¯rm
adopts civil law (2) We also employ a second dummy that accounts for
cross-country di®erences in investor protection; we classify those ¯rms as
¯rms from high investor protection countries if their anti-director score
is equal to or greater than the median value of 3 (LaPorta et al., 1998)
. We control for payout di®erences across industries by classifying each
¯rm in our sample according to their Primary SIC code; based on this
classi¯cation we form seven industry dummies; (1) Agriculture, Fish-
ing, and Forestry (2) Mining and Construction (3) Manufacturing (4)
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Services
20Gorman, Mahanajan, and Weijand (2004) examine the dividend capture in
ADRs. They ¯nd that uncertainty regarding the exact amount of ADR dividend to
be received, but not a foreign exchange risk premium, inhibit dividend capture.
19(5) Wholesale and retail trade (6) Services and (7) Public Administra-
tion. We exclude all ¯nance, insurance, and real estate ¯rms (SIC
beginning with 6).
7 Sample Description & Summary Statistics
In the following subsections, we outline the construction of our sample,
and provide some summary statistics.
7.1 Sample Description
In order totest our predictions, we obtained acomplete list of depositary
receipts from The Bank of New York (www.adrbny.com) , and sourced
additional information from Deutsche Bank (www.adr.db.com) and JP
Morgan (www.adr.com). From each we were able to obtain the names,
listing dates, the ¯rms' country of origin, the type of depositary receipt
(Level 1 OTC, Level 2/3 Exchange (NYSE, Nasdaq, AMEX), Portal
Rule144a) as of July 2003. We also sourced a list of direct listings, for
which the legal requirements for cross-listing are essentially the same as
those for ADRs from the o±cial website of the NYSE and Nasdaq. For
¯rms with joint simultaneous DR listings (OTC/Portal Programs) we
classify these ¯rms as Level 1 OTC programs. If a ¯rm has multiple
DR programs, with di®erent start dates, we classify this ¯rm according
to its earliest DR program, and ignore any subsequent programs. Fi-
nally, we include only those ¯rms with sponsored DR programs; ¯rms
that voluntarily trade as ADRs in the U.S. To be included in our ¯-
nal sample we imposed the following preconditions; [1] We only include
those ¯rms for which data relating to both variants of our dependent
variable is available [2] We exclude those ¯rms with either, zero pre or
post listing dividend payout date. This `Narrow' sample approach is
nessesecary to ensure that any conclusions that we make are not due to
a signi¯cant change in our sample makeup around the cross-listing data.
We obtained our non-cross listed sample from the country lists provided
by Datastream. From the country lists, we exclude all ¯rms with a U.S.
listing, and include only those ¯rms in our sample with data available on
all our control variables. We also place the following datarestrictions on
both samples; [1] We exclude observations due to probable data errors;
negative net sales or revenues, negative MBA, and negative dividends
paid. [2] In common with LaPorta et al. (2000), and Liu (2002), we
eliminate possible outliers in our dependent variable(s) by removing the
top1% of outliers. [3] Due to possible errors in scaling the data with net
sale or revenues, we also eliminate outliers from each of our covariates
by eliminating the top and bottom 1% of observations.
20After imposing these requirements, our ¯nal sample is composed of
3,418 ¯rms from 39 countries; 496 of which are either ¯rms trading in
the U.S. as ADRs or listed directly on U.S. Exchanges, the remainding
2,922 are non cross-listed ¯rms. Our sample description is provided
in Table 1. We list, by country, the number of non cross-listed ¯rms,
cross-listed ¯rms, and the number of U.S. cross-listings by type, both
direct cross-listings, for which Canadian ¯rms dominate the sample, and
the di®erent types of ADR programs. Like Liu (2002), but unlike La-
Porta et al. (2000) we include those ¯rms from countries with manda-
tory dividend requirements. As a result, we include ¯rms from Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, and Greece21. The UK have the largest number of
cross-listed ¯rms in our sample, followed by Canada and Hong Kong.
Colombia, Denmark, and Russia supply only one ¯rm each that meet all
our data requirements.
7.2 Summary Statistics
Tables 2(a) and(b) and table3 contain some summary statistics for both
our cross-listed and non cross-listed sample. First, in tables 2(a) & (b)
we calculate the mean and median dividend-to-earnings, and dividend-
to-cash°ow ratios for each country. Furthermore, we classify each coun-
try accordingto a measure of investor protection. We characterise those
¯rms with an Anti-Director Rights measure of 3 or above as countries
that a®ordtominority investors/outsiders, signi¯cant protection. Those
countries, below this threshold areclassi¯ed as `PoorInvestor Protection'
countries. Our results suggest that over the period from 1990-2002, div-
idend payouts are signi¯cantly greater in countries where investors are
better protected, results consistent with the Outcome model of divi-
dends proposed by La Porta et al. (2000). The time series behaviour of
dividends-to-cash°ow, and dividends-to-earnings are shown graphically
in ¯gures (1) and (2). Figures (3) to (14) outline the behaviour of div-
idend payout around the cross-listing date for each ADR level, for both
developed and emerging markets.
In table 3 we present summary statistics for our full, non cross-listed,
and cross-listed sample, respectively over our full sample period. They
suggest that our mean cross-listed ¯rm pays lower dividends, is more
pro¯table with greater growth opportunities, and is larger. These re-
sults are consistent with the ¯ndings of Pagano et al. (2003), Claessens
et al. (2003), and Durand and Tarca (2002), amongst others Finally we
report pairwise correlations for all our ¯rm level variables employed in
our analysis in table 6. The majority of the relations documented are of
21The dividend requirements in each country are; 50, 30, 50, and 35% respectively.
21the expected sign; for example, dividend payout (dividends-to earnings)
is negatively related to debt, earnings volatility, growth opportunities,
and ¯rmsize arepositively relatedto ¯rm pro¯tability. However, the ta-
ble also presents some puzzling ¯ndings; both variants of our dependent
variable are negatively correlatedwith FCF, while dividends-to-cash°ow
is positively correlated with growth opportunities (MBA). Finally, we
exclude from our analysis asset tangibility due to its signi¯cantly high
correlation with FCF.
In tables 4(a) and (b) we present some simple before-after estimates
of each variant of our dependent variable. The behaviour of dividends
aroundthe list year are outlinedin¯gures 3to 14. We present meanand
median percentage changes for a number of di®erent pre and post-listing
intervals. Speci¯cally, we present statistics for six di®erent intervals; the
¯ve year pre and post-listing period (column 6), the year prior to listing
and the lsit year (column 7), two years post-listing (column 8), and ¯ve
years post listing (column 9). Columns 10 and 11 present results for the
list year and two years post and ¯ve years post listing, respectively. We
concentrate on outliningthe meanandmedian percentage change results
presented in column 6. We present results for each ADR level, but seg-
mented by country development (developed vs. emerging) and country
legal origon (low and high investor protection). We outline the results
for the developed/emerging market divide. The results for dividends-
to-earnings, and dividends-to-cash°ow are presented in tables 4 (a) and
(b) respectively. The results for over-the-counter ¯rms are similiar for
both variants of our dependent variable: emerging market ¯rms that
trade over-the-counter payout higher mean and median dividends, post-
listing. On the contrary, emerging market ¯rms pay less dividends post
trading over-the-counter. In general, the results for Portal ¯rms suggest
that post-listing, they payout larger dividends. Finally, exchange listed
¯rms appear to pay lower dividends post-listing, although the results are
mixed for emerging market exchange listed ¯rms.
Figures 1 and 2present the time series behaviour of dividend payouts
over time for both emerging and developed market ¯rms. In line with
theextant literature, the graphs suggest that over time dividend payouts
have been falling (Osobov, 2004, Fama and French, 2001, DeAngelo,
DeAngelo and Skinner, 2002, Baker and Wugler, 2002).
8 Results
Our results are presentedintables 5a-d. Tables 5 (a) and(b) outline the
results for each di®erent hypotheses outlined in section 5. In each we
employ only those ¯rm controls outlined in Bhattacharyya et al. (2003),
22and Faccio et al. (2003); growth opportunities MBA, leverage and ¯rm
size Total Assets. We report results for both variants of our dependent
variable. Second, we augment our vector of ¯rm level control variables
with three additional controls; ¯rm pro¯tability ROE, free cash °ow
FCF and earnings volatility EarnVolatility. The results are presented
in tables 5 (c) and (d).
Each table of results are laid out in the same way; column 1 presents
our dependent variable and our vector of control variables, and column
2 the predicted sign for each covariate. Column 3, 4 and 5 outlines the
results for hypothesis 1, 2 and 3 presented in equations 3 and 4, 5 and
6, and 7 and 8 respectively. We present our results by hypotheses.
8.1 Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 is outlined in equations 6 and 7 and the results are pre-
sented in column 3 of each table. We begin by discussing the results for
tables 5 (a) and (b). The results for hypothesis 1 are broadly similar
using both variants of our dependent variable. In each, our ¯rm level
covariates are all correctly signed and all are statistically signi¯cant at
conventional levels. Larger ¯rms payout more dividends, while leverage
and growth opportunities impact negatively on dividend payout. Our
results for exchange listed ¯rms are consistent with our outlined hy-
pothesis; ¢¯2 6= 0: The coe±cient suggests that post-listing, exchange
listed ¯rms pay signi¯cantly lower dividends, implying that ¯rms sub-
stitute improved governance governance for dividends. This is in line
with Liu (2002). These results are consistent with the notion that
the domestic investors of ¯rms cross listed on U.S. exchanges are better
protected under the adopted U.S. disclosure and legal regime. The ad-
dition of our additional covariates, presented in tables 5 (c) and (d) do
not change our earlier conclusions. We ¯nd that of the additional co-
variates, only earnings volatility is statistically signi¯cant, although the
other two are correctly signed. As before, we ¯nd that ¯rms that sub-
stitute their home level governance for the U.S. governance regime o®er
greater protection to their domestic/ordinary shareholders; signi¯cantly
lower dividend payout implies this.
The results for ¯rms that trade over-the-counter and/or on the Portal
are inconsistent with our hypothesis outlined in equation 7. In fact we
¯nd that ¢¯1;¢¯3 6= 0: For both OTC and Portal ¯rms, we ¯nd that
post-listing these ¯rms pay signi¯cantly lower dividends (in the case of
OTC this is only the case using dividends-to-earnings). When we add
to our model our additional covariates, we ¯nd that ¢¯1 is no longer
signi¯cant. However, ¢¯3 remains statistically signi¯cant. Without
additional work we cannot claim that this is inconsistent with the le-
23gal bonding hypothesis. For example, cross listing in the U.S. is not
the only bonding device for ¯rms to commit to reduce better protect
their minority shareholders. For example, research by Durnev and Kim
(2002) and Klapper and Love (2002) suggest that there are alternative
bonding mechanisms, in the form of ¯rm level/internal governance as-
sociated with higher q's and ¯rm performance. In connection, Siegel
(2003) outlines that at least some of those ¯rms from emerging markets
that choose not to cross-list in the U.S., refrain from doing so because
`they had better alternatives'. This alternative was in the form of a
crossborder strategic alliance. This argument suggest that post-listing,
¯rms that tradeon the Portal commit to better protect theirinvestors by
initiating ¯rm-level governance policies designed to do so. In fact, Pine-
gar and Ravichandran (2004, p.40) conclude that Rule 144a/Reg S ¯rms
\can and often do respond to incentives to create their own assurances
of fair treatment for minority investors", thus aligning the interests of
both controlling insiders and outsiders. They reach similar conclusions
in an earlier paper (Pinegar and Ravichandran, 2002)22.
8.2 Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 is outlined in equations 8 and 9 and the results are pre-
sented in column 4 of each table. We begin by discussing the results
for tables 5 (a) and (b). Like before, we begin by discussing our results
for tables 5 (a) and (b). In both, yet again we ¯nd that out three
covariates are correctly signed and statistically signi¯cant. In general,
we ¯nd that ¢¯2 ¤FCF = 0; ¢¯1 ¤ FCF;¢¯3 ¤FCF = 0: Although
¢¯3 ¤ FCF 6= 0 in table 5 (a), the coe±cient is insigni¯cant in tables
5 (b), (c) and (d). For both OTC and exchange listed ¯rms, the coef-
¯cients remain statistically insigni¯cant in tables 5 (c) and (d). These
¯ndings do not nessecarily imply no change in domestic investor protec-
tion; whereas ¯rms pay lower dividends post-listing, the role played by
dividends in controlling the agency costs associated with free cash°ow is
maintained. Second, this ¯nding may be a result of measurement error
in our construction of our free cash °ow variable. In each speci¯cation,
free cash °ow is surprisingly statistically insigni¯cant. This may drive
the conclusions that we have drawn.
22This argument also suggests that ¯rms that list on U.S. exchanges may also
do the very same. Consequently, the conclusions that we have drawn may thus
wrongly attribute the implied increase in investor protection to the adoption of the
U.S. goverance regime. This requires further analysis.
248.3 Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 is outlined in equations 10 and 11 and the results are pre-
sented in column 5 of each table. In this speci¯cation we examine the
impact of cross listing in the U.S. on the dividend payout of ¯rms domi-
ciled in countries characterised by poor protection of minority investors.
In line with the legal bonding hypothesis the domestic investors of these
¯rms should enjoy the greatest incremental increase in protection. Con-
sequently, our ¯ndings for hypothesis 1 should be greater in magnitude
(and of the same sign). Are ¯ndings are consistent with this argument.
We begin with tables 5 (a) and (b).
In each, our ¯rm level covariates are all correctly signed and all are
statistically signi¯cant at conventional levels. Larger ¯rms payout more
dividends, while leverage and growth opportunities impact negatively on
dividend payout. Our results for exchange listed ¯rms are consistent
with our outlined hypothesis; ¢¯2 ¤FCF 6= 0 > ¢¯2 implying that in
line with the legal bonding hypothesis, the domestic investors of ¯rms
who pre-listing enjoyed little investor protection, experience the greatest
incremental gains in investor protection. This result is robust to the use
ofboth variants of our dependent variable and the inclusionof additional
covariates in tables 5 (c) and (d).
Our results for OTC ¯rms are the same as before, ¢¯1 ¤ LowIP =
0 = ¢¯1: However, unlike hypothesis 1, the results for Portal ¯rms
suggest that post-listing their domestic/ordinary investors are not bet-
ter protected, consistent withthelegal bonding hypothesis. However, on
closer inspection our results are consistent with Pinegar and Ravichan-
dran (2004). Their analysis suggests that post-listing developed mar-
ket/high investor protection ¯rms commit to better protect their in-
vestors. It may well be the case that developing market ¯rms where
investors are poorly protected do not commit to better protect their in-
verstors post listing in the U.S. This line of reasoning is consistent with
our ¯ndings. However until we further examine this our initial results
remain tentative.
8.4 Self-Selection Issues
To further reduce concerns relating to self-selection we estimate pre and
post-listing dividend payout for cross listed ¯rms relative to non cross
listed ¯rms. The results presented in tables 5 (g) and (h) suggest that
post-listing cross listed ¯rms dividend payout is signi¯cantly di®erenent
than pre listing payout. We present results for hypothesis I and II.
Our results suggest, in line with our previous ¯ndings that ¯rms that
cross list in the U.S. pay signi¯cantly lower dividends post-listing. Pre-
listing, we ¯nd that these ¯rms tended to payout larger dividends than
25non cross listed ¯rms.
8.5 Di®erence-in-Di®erence Analysis
The results from our di®erence-in-di®erence analysis is presented in ta-
bles 5 (e) and (f). We present results for hypothesis I and II. Our
¯ndings are largely in line with those already documented. We ¯nd
that ¯rms that cross-list on U.S. exchanges and on the Portal pay lower
dividends post-listing. However, we ¯nd that not all the ¯ndings are
statistically signi¯cant but this may be due to the reduced sample size
that data limitations imposed upon us.
9 Concluding Remarks
Using the agency models of dividends we attempt to make inferences
about the incremental protection a®oarded to the domestic investors
of ¯rms cross-listed in the U.S. Our initial results suggest that those
domestic/ordinary investors of ¯rms cross-listed on U.S. exchanges are
better protected post-listing. This is largely consistent with the predic-
tions of the legal bonding hypothesis. Second, and also consistent with
the legal bonding hypothesis our results suggest that trading over-the-
counter inthe U.S. does not increasethe protectionof domestic investors
holding these ¯rms. Inconsistent with the legal bonding hypothesis, we
¯nd that trading in the U.S. under Rule 144a appears to o®er better
protection to the domestic shareholders of these ¯rms. However, we be-
lieve that this is a result of voluntary actions on the part of these ¯rms
to better protect their investors post-listing. However, this warrants
further study. Our ¯ndings also forward the dividend literature in one
notable way. Our results suggest that governance reforms, external to
both the ¯rm and its' country of residence are e®ective in reducing the
role played by dividends in reducing agency costs. The extant literature
has found that governance reform within a country does likewise.
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Table 1: Sample Description 
 
The following table outlines the number of ADRs’ per country, and ADR Level (Level I (OTC), Level II/III 
Exchange Listed (AMEX, NYSE, NASDAQ), and Rule 144a (PORTAL)).  N (NCL) is the number of non cross-
listed firms included in our analysis.  We employ two measures for our Dependent Variable; Dividend-to-
Earnings (Div/EARN) and Dividend-to-CashFlow (Div/CF) for our sample of firms.  For firms with multiple 
ADR listings, we use the first ADR and do not record subsequent DR programs.  Furthermore, for joint 
OTC/PORTAL listings, we report them as OTC Listings.  All Financial firms (SIC Beginning with 6) are 
excluded.   
 
Country  N(CL)  N(NCL)  Ordinary  Level I  Level II/III  Rule 144a 
Argentina  5  17  0  0  5  0 
Australia  23  86  0  14  8  1 
Austria  9  23  0  9  0  0 
Belgium  3  22  0  2  1  0 
Brazil  21  222  0  13  7  1 
Canada  37  112  37  0  37  0 
Chile  4  25  0  0  4  0 
China  8  22  0  3  5  0 
Colombia  1  25  0  0  0  1 
Denmark  1  33  0  0  1  0 
Finland  8  31  0  4  3  1 
France  24  134  0  12  12  0 
Germany  17  129  0  8  7  2 
Greece  1  17  0  1  0  0 
Hong Kong  36  65  0  31  3  2 
India  32  46  0  13  6  13 
Ireland  2  20  0  2  0  0 
Israel  0  66  0  0  0  0 
Italy  15  51  0  6  8  1 
Japan  28  684  0  15  12  1 
Korea  14  44  0  5  5  4 
Mexico  16  33  0  4  11  1 
Netherlands#   13  19  0  5  8  0 
New Zealand  2  34  0  1  1  0 
Norway  8  22  0  4  3  1 
Peru   3  56  0  0  1  2 
Phillipines  5  22  0  4  0  1 
Poland  3  63  0  3  0  0 
Portugal  4  29  0  1  2  1 
Russia  1  0  0  0  1  0 
Singapore  11  66  0  10  0  1 
South Africa  19  23  0  12  5  2  
 
Country  N(CL)  N(NCL)  Ordinary  Level I  Level II/III  Rule 144a 
Spain  5  83  0  1  3  1 
Sweden  10  28  0  2  7  1 
Switzerland  8  7  0  2  4  2 
Taiwan  23  27  0  8  5  10 
Thailand  8  28  0  8  0  0 
Turkey  0  120  0  0  0  0 
UK  64 
 










           
  
 
Table 2a: High Investor Protection ADR Firms by Country (1990-2002) 
 
The following table outlines the Mean (Median) Country dividend data (Dividend/Cash Flow & 
Dividend/Earnings) by Legal Origon.  We define those countries’ as ‘High Investor Protection’ if their level of 
Investor Protection (‘Anti-Director Rights’ from LLSV (1998)) is equal to or greater than the median value of 3.  
Part (a) of Table 1 is comprised of ‘High Investor Protection’ Countries, and Part (b) ‘Low Investor Protection’ 
Countries.  N is the number of ADRs per country for which Div/EARN, and (Div/CF) data is available.  Our 
two variants of Dividend Payout are sourced from Worldscope.  Div/EARN is ((Dividends per 
Share/Earnings per Share)*100) and Div/CF is ((Dividends per Share/Cash Flow per Share)*100).  The 
Difference in Medians’ (in brackets) is calculated using the Mann-Whitney nonparametric test.  The difference 
in means is calculated using a two-sample t-test assuming unequal variances.  *** represents significance at 
the 1% level.              
 
Country  N  Div/Earnings (%)  Div/CF (%) 








































































































  Div/EARN %   Div/CF % 








High vs. Low   Mean  0.00***  Mean  0.00*** 
  Median  0.00***  Median   0.00*** 





Table 2b:  Low Investor Protection ADR Firms by Country (1990-2002)  
 
The following table outlines the Mean (Median) Country dividend data (Dividend/Cash Flow & 
Dividend/Earnings) by Legal Origon.  We define those countries’ as ‘High Investor Protection’ if their level of 
Investor Protection (‘Ant Director Rights’ from LLSV (1998)) is equal to or greater than the median value of 3 
(See Appendix).  Part (a) of Table 1 is comprised of ‘High Investor Protection’ Countries, and Part (b) ‘Low 
Investor Protection’ Countries.  N is the number of ADR’s per country for which Div/EARN, and (Div/CF) data 
is available.  Our two variants of Dividend Payout are sourced from Worldscope.  Div/EARN is ((Dividends 
per Share/Earnings per Share)*100) and Div/CF is ((Dividends per Share/Cash Flow per Share)*100).            
    
Country  N  Div/Earnings (%)  Div/CF (%) 



























































































































Country  N  Div/Earnings (%)  Div/CF (%) 






































Table 3: Summary Statistics 
 
In the following table we outline summary statistics for all firm-level control variables included in our analysis for the full sample, the non cross-listed sample , and 
the  cross-listed sample .  We report; (1) the number of firm-year observations for each variable (2) Mean (3) Median (4) Minimum (5) Maximum (6) Standard 
Deviation. We report difference in means for the CL and NCL firms using the Satterthwaite (unequal variance) t-test.  ***, **, * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 
10% significance level respectively.     
 








































































































































































































































 Table 4(a): Dividends-to-Earnings Changes around the List Date - (Year ‘0’)  
 
The following table outlines the percentage change in Dividends-to-Earnings Ratio’s ((Dividends per share/Earnings per share))*100) of American Depositary Receipt firms, by 
country and ADR Level around the time of listing in the United States.  The sample of firms includes both Developed and emerging market firms, and firms domiciled in High & 
Low Level Investor Protection countries’ that list via American Depositary Receipts in the United States on Level I, II/III, or Rule 144a.  Dividends-to-Earnings Ratio’s (%) in the 
year -1 is the Median (Mean) Div/EARN in the year prior to listing in the United States via an ADR.  Year ‘0’ refers to the Dividends-to-Earnings Ratio in the year of listing in the 
US.  ?(-1,0), ?(-1,2), ?(-1,5), ?(0,2) and ?(0,5) refer to respectively the (Mean) & Median % Change in Dividends-to-Earnings from Year -1 to Year 0, Year -1 to Year 2, Year -1 to 
Year 5, Year 0 to Year 2, and finally Year 0 to Year 5.  We report Paired t-tests for testing the Mean difference, and the Mann-Whitney test (z-stat) for the Median difference in the 
Dividends-to-Earnings ratio ‘before and after’ the list date – P-Value is reported in Brackets.  We report the changes for Level I (OTC), Level II/III (EXCHANGE), and Rule 144A 
(PORTAL) ADRs’.  
 



































































M-W Emerg.  -  -  -  -  -  0.5403  0.3574  0.4541  0.7624  0.7053 
t 
(Developed) 



































































M-W Emerg.  -  -  -  -  -  0.5594  0.9518  0.2392  0.5894  0.6321 
t 
(Developed) 























































                                                 










((B) – (A))%  ?(-1,0)  ?(-1,2)  ?(-1,5)  ?(0,2)  ?(0,5) 
t 
(Emerging) 










M-W Emerg.  -  -  -  -  -  0.4821  0.9169  0.7829  0.5477  0.4704 
t 
(Developed) 










M-W Dev.  -  -  -  -  -  0.818  0.6945  0.5157  0.8469  0.6179 




















































M-W Low  -  -  -  -  -  0.1093  0.011**  0.1348  0.3298  0.90 
t  
(High IP) 



































































M-W Low  -  -  -  -  -  0.0685*  0.1143  0.7409  0.8917  0.740 
t 
(High IP) 
-  -  -  -  -          0.56 
(0.581) 

























































M-W Low  -  -  -  -  -  0.5083  0.8730  0.8048  0.3848  0.40 
t  
(High IP) 










M-W High            0.9179  0.5650  0.5582  0.6238  0.4984 
                     Table 4(b): Dividends-to-Cash Flow (Div/CF) Changes around the List Date - (Year ‘0’)  
 
The following table outlines the percentage change in Dividends-to-Cashflow  ((Dividends per share/Cash Flow per share))*100) of American Depositary Receipt firms, by 
country and ADR Level around the time of listing in the United States.  The sample of firms includes both Developed and emerging market firms, and firms domiciled in High & 
Low Level Investor Protection countries’ that list via American Depositary Receipts in the United States on Level I, II/III, or Rule 144a.  Dividends-to-Cash Flow (%) in the year -1 
is the Median (Mean) Div/CF in the year prior to listing in the United States via an ADR.  Year ‘0’ refers to the Dividends-to-Earnings Ratio in the year of listing in the US.  ?(-
1,0), ?(-1,2), ?(-1,5), ?(0,2) and ?(0,5) refer to respectively the (Mean) & Median % Change in Dividends-to-Cash flow from Year -1 to Year 0, Year -1 to Year 2, Year -1 to Year 5, 
Year 0 to Year 2, and finally Year 0 to Year 5.  We report Paired t-tests for testing the Mean difference, and the Mann-Whitney test (z-stat) for the Median difference in the 
Dividends-to-Cash Flow ‘before and after’ the list date – P-Value is reported in Brackets.  We report t he changes for Level I (OTC), Level II/III (EXCHANGE), and Rule 144A 
(PORTAL) ADRs’.  
 
Series  Div/CF   (-1) 
% 
Div/CF  (0) 
% 





























































M-W Emerg.  -  -  -  -  -  0.8487  0.4843  0.1526  0.6952  0.1822 
t 
(Developed) 



































































M-W Emerg.  -  -  -  -  -  0.8614  0.5082  0.4084  0.3753  0.2921 
t 
(Developed) 























































t  -  -  -  -  -  0.65  0.08  -1.04  -0.44  -1.37 
                                                 
1 The sample contains’ 13 firms.   Series  Div/CF   (-1) 
% 
Div/CF  (0) 
% 




((B) – (A))%  ?(-1,0)  ?(-1,2)  ?(-1,5)  ?(0,2)  ?(0,5) 
(Emerging)  (0.519)  (0.933)  (0.31)  (0.664)  (0.181) 
M-W Emerg.  -  -  -  -  -  0.8538  0.8830  0.7099  0.7410  0.6169 
t 
(Developed) 










M-W Dev.  -  -  -  -  -  0.4271  0.2615  0.7070  0.7407  0.7650 




















































M-W Low  -  -  -  -  -  0.1138  0.0681*  0.0128**  0.6982  0.2548 
t  
(High IP) 



































































M-W Low  -  -  -  -  -  0.5278  0.4791  0.3725  0.9927  0.6480 
t  
(High IP) 



































































M-W Low  -  -  -  -  -  0.8617  0.4466  0.6415  0.5793  0.7729 
t  
(High IP) 










M-W High  -  -  -  -  -  0.6186  0.3312  0.1982  0.6485  0.3876 




Table 5(a): Pre and Post Listing Dividends-to-Earnings and the simple model 
 
In the following table we present results for our full sample over the period from 1980-2002.  We estimate the 
following equation using a Panel Random Effects Tobit Model controlling for firm, country and industry 
effects. We employ two variants of our dependent variable; Dividend-to-Earnings (%) and Dividend-to-
Cashflow (%).  *, **, *** represent significance at 10, 5, and 1% respectively.  P-values are reported in 
parentheses.  In this table, we employ three firm-level controls; MBA, Firm Size (Natural Log Total Assets ($)) 
and Leverage (Debt).  All firm variables are defined in the appendix.   
 
Dividends-to-Earnings  Predicted Sign  Hypothesis I  Hypothesis II  Hypothesis III 
Constant 
 
































+/-  -1.53 
(0.097)* 
-  - 
Level 2/3 
 
+/-  -4.66 
(0.00)*** 
-  - 
Rule 144a 
 
+/-  -6.73 
(0.00)*** 
-  - 
Level 1*FCF 
 



























  Included  Included  Included 
Country Effects 
 





Table 5(b): Pre and Post Listing Dividends-to-Cashflow and the simple model 
 
In the following table we present results for our full sample over the period from 1980-2002.  We estimate the 
following equation using a Panel Random Effects Tobit Model controlling for firm, country and industry 
effects. We employ two variants of our dependent variable; Dividend-to-Earnings (%) and Dividend-to-
Cashflow (%).  *, **, *** represent significance at 10, 5, and 1% respectively.  P-values are reported in 
parentheses.  In this table, we employ three firm-level controls; MBA, Firm Size (Natural Log Total Assets ($)) 
and Leverage (Debt).  All firm variables are defined in the appendix.   
 
Dividends-to-Cashflow  Predicted Sign  Hypothesis I  Hypothesis II  Hypothesis III 
Constant 
 
































+/-  0.6575 
(0.11) 
-  - 
Level 2/3 
 
+/-  -1.86 
(0.00)*** 
-  - 
Rule 144a 
 
+/-  -3.33 
(0.00)*** 
-  - 
Level 1*FCF 
 



























  Included  Included  Included 
Country Effects 
 





Table 5(c): Pre and Post listing Dividend-to-earnings and the full model 
 
In the following table we present results for our full sample over the period from 1980-2002.  We estimate the 
following equation using a Panel Random Effects Tobit Model controlling for firm, country and industry 
effects. We employ two variants of our dependent variable; Dividend-to-Earnings (%) and Dividend-to-
Cashflow (%).  *, **, *** represent significance at 10, 5, and 1% respectively.  P-values are reported in 
parentheses.  In this table, we employ three firm-level controls; MBA, Firm Size (Natural Log Total Assets ($)) 
and Leverage (Debt), and augment our equation with Return on Equity (ROE), Free Cash Flow (FCF), and 
Earnings Volatility.  All firm variables are defined in the appendix.   
   
Dividends-to-Earnings  Predicted Sign  Hypothesis I  Hypothesis II  Hypothesis III 
Constant 
 
























































+/-  -0.9271 
(0.39) 
-  - 
Level 2/3 
 
+/-  -5.04 
(0.00)*** 
-  - 
Rule 144a 
 
+/-  -7.44 
(0.03)** 
-  - 
Level 1*FCF 
 



























  Included  Included  Included 
Country Effects    Included  Included  Included 
  
 
Table 5(d): Pre and Post Listing Dividend-to-Cashflow and the full model 
 
In the following table we present results for our full sample over the period from 1980-2002.  We estimate the 
following equation using a Panel Random Effects Tobit Model controlling for firm, country and industry 
effects. We employ two variants of our dependent variable; Dividend-to-Earnings (%) and Dividend-to-
Cashflow (%).  *, **, *** represent significance at 10, 5, and 1% respectively.  P-values are reported in 
parentheses.  In this table, we employ three firm-level controls; MBA, Firm Size (Natural Log Total Assets ($)) 
and Leverage (Debt), and augment our equation with Return on Equity (ROE), Free Cash Flow (FCF), and 
Earnings Volatility.  All firm variables are defined in the appendix.      
 
Dividends-to-Cashflow  Predicted Sign  Hypothesis I  Hypothesis II  Hypothesis III 
Constant 
 
























































+/-  1.10 
(0.11) 
-  - 
Level 2/3 
 
+/-  -1.29 
(0.03)** 
-  - 
Rule 144a 
 
+/-  -1.17 
(0.55) 
-  - 
Level 1*FCF 
 



























  Included  Included  Included 
Country Effects 
 
  Included  Included  Included 
  
 
Table 5(e): ‘Difference-in-Difference’ Estimation of Pre and Post-Listing Dividends -
to-Earnings 
 
In the following table we report our ‘Difference-in-Difference’ results for hypothesis I and II controlling for 
firm, country a nd industry effects. For each firm we subtract from Dividends-to-Earnings the median NCL 
Dividends-to-Earnings for each year employed in our analysis.  Our results are those for our Adjusted 
Dividends-to-Earnings.  *, **, *** represent significance at 10, 5, and 1% respectively.  P-values are reported 
in parentheses.  In this table, we employ all firm level variables.  All firm variables are defined in the 


























































Earn Volatility  -  -  3.53e-06 
(0.32) 
-  3.62e-06 
(0.31) 
ROE  +  -  -0.1466 
(0.00)*** 
-  -0.1135 
(0.00)*** 
FCF  +  -  -0.00005 
(0.58) 








-  - 
Level 2/3 
 




-  - 
Rule 144a 
 




-  - 
Level 1*AntiDirector 
 


















  Included  Included  Included  Included 
Country Effects 
 
  Included  Included  Included  Included  
 
Table 5(f): ‘Difference-in-Difference’ Estimation of Pre and Post-Listing Dividends-
to-Cashflow 
 
In the following table we report our ‘Difference-in-Difference’ results for hypothesis I and II controlling for 
firm, country a nd industry effects. For each firm we subtract from Dividends-to-Cashflow the median NCL 
Dividends-to-Cashflow  for each year employed in our analysis.  Our results are those for our Adjusted 
Dividends-to-Cashflow.  *, **, *** represent significance at 10, 5, and 1% respectively.  P-values are reported 
in parentheses.  In this table, we employ all firm level variables.  All firm variables are defined in the 



























































FCF  +  -  0.0011 
(0.74) 
-  0.0012 
(0.72) 
Earn Volatility  -  -  8.24E-07 
(0.62) 
-  8.90E-07 
(0.60) 
ROE  +  -  0.0228 
(0.00)*** 








-  - 
Level 2/3 
 




-  - 
Rule 144a 
 




-  - 
Level 1*AntiDirector 
 


















  Included  Included  Included  Included 
Country Effects 
 
  Included  Included  Included  Included  
 
Table 5(g): Pre and Post-Listing Dividends-to-Earnings for Cross Listed Firms and Self-Selection 
 
In the following table we report pre and post-listing estimates of dividends-to-earnings for cross-listed firms over the full sample period.  Each equation is estimated 
separately with dummy variables employed in each specification representing pre and post-listing time periods.  We present only the estimated coefficients for our 
dummy variables.  Furthermore we present only the results for hypothesis I and II.  P stats are presented in parenthesis.   
 
Dividends-to-Earnings  Hypothesis I  Hypothesis I  Hypothesis II  Hypothesis II 
  Simple Model  Full Model  Simple Model   Full Model 

































-  -  -  - 
Level 1*IP 
 





























Table 5(h): Pre and Post-Listing Dividends-to-Cashflow for Cross Listed Firms and Self-Selection 
 
In the following table we report pre and post-listing estimates of dividends-to-cashflow for cross-listed firms over the full sample period.  Each equation is estimated 
separately with dummy variables employed in each specification representing pre and post-listing time periods.  We present only the estimated coefficients for our 
dummy variables.  Furthermore we present only the results for hypothesis I and II.  P stats are presented in parenthesis.     
Dividends-to-Earnings  Hypothesis I  Hypothesis I  Hypothesis II  Hypothesis II 
  Simple Model  Full Model  Simple Model   Full Model 

































-  -  -  - 
Level 1*IP 
 





























Table 6: Correlation Matrix 
 
In the following table (Note; Given that all financial variables have the same denominator, the pair-wise correlations are in all 
likelihood overstated) we report pairwise correlations for our firm-level control variables.  ***, **, * represent significant at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level of significance respectively.        
 
 
  DE  DCF  COGS  ROE  Tang  Earn  FCF  Debt  MBA  TA 
DivEARN 
 
1                   
DivCF 
 
0.59***  1                 
COGS 
 
-0.011***  -0.0315***  1               
ROE 
 
0.057***  0.1617***  -0.0291***  1             
Tang 
 
-0.0022  -0.0062  -0.0006  -0.0006  1           
Earn 
 
-0.031***  -0.0443***  0.0202***  -0.025***  -0.0001  1         
FCF 
 
-0.0058  -0.0056  -0.0008  -0.0084  0.9999***  0.040***  1       
Debt 
 
-0.007***  -0.006***  -0.0005  -0.0015  0.0052  0.0012  0.541***  1     
MBA 
 
-0.0304***  0.0159***  -0.0647***  0.20***  -0.0041  -0.0206***  -0.0058  -0.0028  1   
TA 
 




Table 7: Variable Descriptions 
 
In the following table we report the source and description of the firm, country, and industry level variables employed in our analysis.  The definitions given are those 
outlined by the data providers.  We report the expected sign for each covariate as outlined by theory and extant studies.  The descriptions given are those, albeit 
abbreviated, by the data provider.          
 
Variable  Expected Sign  Source  Description 
Dividends-to-
Earnings 
N/A  Worldscope  Dividends per share represent the total amount of dividends declared during the year, Earnings per share represent 
the earnings for the year 
Dividends-to-
Cashflow 
N/A  Worldscope  Dividends per share represent the total amount of dividends declared during the year, Cash Flow per share 
represents the cash earnings per share of the company 
MBA 
 
-  Datastream  Also called Discount to Net Asset Value, divides the market value by the net book value 
FCF 
 
+  Worldscope  =Earnings before Interest and Taxation (EBIT) + Depreciation Depletion & Amortization (DDA) – Capital Expenditures 
Debt 
 





-  Worldscope  COGS definition differs across industries.  For manufacturing companies, COGS represents specific or direct 
manufacturing cost of labour and material in the production of finished goods.  For merchandise companies COGS 





+  Worldscope  EPS divided by the book growth per share (Expressed as a %) 
EPS Vol. 
 
-  Worldscope  The variance of the previous three years EPS 
Net Sales 
 
N/A  Worldscope  Represents Gross sales and other operating revenue less discounts, returns and allowances 
Total Assets 
 
+  Worldscope  Total Assets represents the sum of total current assets, long term receivables, investment in unconsolidated 
subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and equipment and other assets. 
Asset Tang 
 
+  Worldscope  Total Assets Less Other Intangible Assets. 
D (Law) 
 
+  LLSV(2000)  D=1 the firm originates from a Common Law Country 
D (Investor 
Protection) 
+  LLSV(1998)  D=1 if a firm originates in a country where investors are highly protected (Anti-director Rights >=median of 3) 
Industry Dummies  N/A  Worldscope  Primary Standard Classification Codes (SIC).   
  
 
ADR Dividend  +/-   Bank of New 
York 
D=1 if a firm pays an ADR Dividend. 
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